The in ‡uential Krugman-Flood-Garber (KFG) model of balance of payment crises assumes that a …xed exchange rate is abandoned if and only if international reserves reach a critical threshold value. From a positive standpoint, the KFG rule is at odds with many episodes in which the central bank has plenty of international reserves at the time of abandonment. We study the optimal exit policy and show that, from a normative standpoint, the KFG rule is suboptimal. We consider a model in which the …xed exchange rate regime has become unsustainable due to an unexpected increase in government spending. We show that, when there are no exit costs, it is optimal to abandon immediately. When there are exit costs, the optimal abandonment time is a decreasing function of the size of the …scal shock. For large …scal shocks, immediate abandonment is optimal. Our model is consistent with evidence suggesting that many countries exit …xed exchange rate regimes with still plenty of international reserves in the central bank's vault.
Introduction
Consider an open economy with a …xed exchange rate that su¤ers an unexpected …scal shock. This shock consists of an increase in government expenditures that has to be …nanced with seignorage. When, if at all, should the …xed exchange rate regime be abandoned? Further, suppose that, with some probability, a future …scal reform or a …nancial package from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) can restore the sustainability of the …xed exchange rate regime. For how long should policy makers wait for this scenario to materialize?
The decision to exit a …xed exchange rate regime is one of the most impor-
tant policy issues in open-economy macroeconomics. A recent case in point is
Argentina's abandonment in early 2002 of its 10-year old "Convertibility plan" that had tied the peso to the U.S. dollar at a one-to-one rate since April 1991.
Most analysts agree that …xing the exchange rate was an e¤ective strategy to eliminate runaway in ‡ation. However, in the mid 1990s, as the …scal situation began to deteriorate, the question of whether Argentina should abandon the …xed exchange rate began to surface with increasing frequency. 1 The IMF rescue packages of December 2000 and August 2001 bought Argentina some time but, in the end, the …xed exchange rate had to be abandoned in January 2002.
Economic theory o¤ers surprisingly little guidance as to the optimal time to exit a …xed exchange rate regime. The dominant paradigm for understanding this issue is the model proposed by Krugman (1979) and Flood and Garber (1984) , which we refer to as the KFG model. This model, which builds on work by Salant and Henderson (1978) , makes two central assumptions. The …rst is that the root cause of the eventual abandonment of the …xed exchange rate is an unsustainable …scal policy. The second assumption is that the central bank follows an ad-hoc exit rule, whereby the …xed exchange rate regime is abandoned only when the central bank exhausts its foreign exchange reserves and its ability to borrow.
To study the empirical plausibility of these two hypotheses, Table 1 collects data for 51 episodes in which …xed exchange rate regimes were abandoned. Such episodes are typically referred to as "currency crises."These episodes were selected from an updated version of Kaminsky and Reinhart's (1999) list of crisis episodes according to the criteria outlined in Appendix 7.1. Table 1 reports the change in the exchange rate in the month in which the …xed exchange rate regime was abandoned, as well as the change in the exchange rate in the 12 months before and after the abandonment. 2 Table 1 also reports the rate of change in real government spending in the three years prior to the crisis and the reserve losses that occurred in the 12 months prior to the crisis.
We view the …scal data in Table 1 as lending empirical support to the …rst KFG assumption. There were increases in real government spending in the three years prior to the abandonment of the peg in 80 percent (37 out of 46) of the episodes for which we have …scal data. Therefore, …scal shocks are plausible suspects as the root cause of the decision to abandon a …xed exchange rate.
On the other hand, we think of the reserve-loss data in Table 1 as suggesting that the second KFG assumption is empirically implausible. While the KFG model is not explicit about the critical lower bound for international reserves (is it zero? is it negative?), it is clearly in the spirit of the model that the monetary authority holds on to the peg for as long as it can. We would thus expect to see central banks exhaust their international reserves before the …xed exchange rate is abandoned. Figure 1 depicts a histogram of the fraction of initial reserves lost during the 12 months prior to the crisis. In 12 out of 51 episodes, countries had non-positive reserve losses (i.e., they gained reserves). In 38 out of the 51 episodes (or roughly 75 percent), reserve losses were less than 40 percent of initial reserves.
While there were cases in which the monetary authority was willing to lose a large amount of reserves before devaluing, in most cases the peg was abandoned with plenty of ammunition left in the central bank's co¤ers. In other words, the evidence suggests that the monetary authority chooses to devalue as opposed to being forced to devalue by literally exhausting its reserves and its ability to borrow. We conclude that the KFG exit rule, a critical component of the KFG model, is inconsistent with the empirical behavior of reserves in countries that have abandoned …xed exchange rates. In addition, and given that it assumes an exogenous exit rule, the KFG model is unsuitable for understanding the decision to abandon a …xed exchange rate regime.
In this paper, we study the optimal exit from a …xed exchange rate regime. 3 Our analysis is in the spirit of the literature on optimal monetary and …scal policy pioneered by Lucas and Stokey (1983) . We argue that the assumption that central bankers choose the optimal time to abandon the peg generates empirical implications that are more plausible than those associated with the KFG exit rule. 4 Our analysis is based on a standard cash-in-advance small-open-economy model, extended to incorporate rational policymakers. We …rst consider the case where there are no costs of abandoning the peg. In this case it is optimal to abandon the peg as soon as the …scal shock occurs and without incurring any reserve losses.
This policy is optimal independently of the level of international reserves and of whether the central bank faces a borrowing constraint. We then consider the case in which there are costs of abandoning the peg.
These exit costs can re ‡ect, for instance, output losses or the cost of bailing out the banking system. 5 We choose to abstract from the source of these costs and simply assume that devaluing entails some …scal and social cost. In this case, there is a certain threshold value for the …scal shock beyond which it is optimal to abandon immediately, thus incurring no reserve losses. For …scal shocks smaller than this threshold, the optimal exit time is a decreasing function of the size of the …scal shock. In other words, the smaller the …scal shock, the longer is the optimal delay.
Intuitively, the optimal exit time results from the trade o¤ between two factors.
For a given …scal shock, delaying the abandonment of the peg reduces the present discounted value of the cost of abandoning. However, a longer delay requires a permanently higher level of in ‡ation once the peg is abandoned. This increase in the post-abandonment rate of in ‡ation produces a larger intertemporal distortion in consumption decisions. For large …scal shocks, the cost of delaying (i.e., the larger intertemporal distortion) dominates because the gain from delaying is bounded by the economy's resources.
We then present some back-of-the-envelope calculations based on our model, the …scal data in Table 1 , and empirical estimates of the cost of balance of payment crises. These calculations suggest that immediate abandonment should be at least as common as delayed abandonment. Our model is therefore consistent with the observation that many pegs are abandoned when there are still plenty of international reserves at the central banks'disposal.
To study the theoretical robustness of our results, we then consider four extensions of the basic model: (i) time-varying exit costs, (ii) social, but non-…scal, costs of abandoning the peg, (iii) more general preferences, and (iv) the case in which the exist cost depends positively on the …scal shock itself. In every single case, our main results go through which attests to the theoretical robustness of the paper's main message.
We then consider a stochastic version of our model in which the costs of abandoning arise endogenously. There are no …scal or social exit costs but …scal fundamentals are random. These fundamentals are governed by a stochastic process that captures the idea that a …scal reform is more likely to occur while the economy has a …xed exchange rate. In particular, we assume that, while the exchange rate is …xed, there may be a …scal reform that restores the sustainability of the …xed exchange rate. 6 This reform arrives according to a Poisson process. Once the economy abandons the …xed exchange rate regime, there is no hope of a …s-cal reform and the initial …scal shock must be …nanced with seignorage revenues.
There is thus an option value to maintaining the peg. In this context, the cost of abandoning the peg consists in giving up this option value. We show that there is a close connection, both formally and in terms of the properties of the optimal exit time, between this model and our benchmark model. In the stochastic model there is also a threshold value of the …scal shock above which it is optimal to abandon as soon as the …scal shock occurs. For shocks with values below this threshold, there is a negative relation between the size of the shock and the optimal exit time.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 introduces the model. Section 3 derives the basic results for the deterministic case. Section 4 examines the theoretical robustness of our results. Section 5 develops and solves the stochastic version of the model. Section 6 concludes.
The Basic Model
Consider a standard, optimizing, small-open-economy model in which money is introduced via a cash-in-advance constraint. All agents, including the government, can borrow and lend in international capital markets at a constant real interest rate r. There is a single consumption good in the economy and no barriers to trade. The law of one price holds: P t = S t P t , where P t and P t denote the domestic and foreign price level, respectively. The exchange rate, S t , is de…ned as units of domestic currency per unit of foreign currency. For convenience we assume that P t = 1; hence P t = S t .
Before the …scal shock occurs at time t = 0 , the exchange rate is …xed at a level S. For t < 0, the economy has a sustainable …xed exchange rate regime and the government can satisfy its intertemporal budget constraint without resorting to seignorage. At t = 0 the economy su¤ers a '…scal shock': an increase in government spending that must be …nanced with seignorage revenues. Generating these revenues requires abandoning the …xed exchange rate regime at some point in time. Denote by T the time at which the …xed exchange rate regime is abandoned.
We wish to solve for the optimal value of T , which we denote by T .
Households
The representative household maximizes its lifetime utility, V , which depends on its consumption path, c t :
The discount factor is denoted by . The household's ‡ow budget constraint is
Throughout the paper, a dot over a variable represents the derivative of that variable with respect to time. Here b t denotes the household's holdings of net foreign bonds that yield a real rate of return of r and y is a constant, exogenous ‡ow of output. The variable m t represents real money balances, de…ned as m t = M t =P t , where M t denotes nominal money holdings. The variable " t denotes the rate of devaluation, which coincides with the in ‡ation rate, " t = _ P t =P t = _ S t =S t . To eliminate inessential dynamics, we assume that r = .
As in Drazen and Helpman (1987) , equation (2.2) takes into account the possibility of discrete changes in b t and M t at a …nite set of points in time, J. Below we see that this set contains t = 0 and the time at which the peg is abandoned, T . These jumps are de…ned as b t b t b t , where b t represents the limit from the left. Since at any point in time after t = 0, the total level of real …nancial assets cannot change discretely, b t + m t = b t + m t . Consumption is subject to a cash-in-advance constraint:
Since we only consider environments in which the nominal interest rate is positive, equation (2.3) will always hold with equality.
The ‡ow budget constraint, (2.2) and the transversality condition, lim t!1 e rt b t = 0, implies the following intertemporal budget constraint:
This budget constraint can be further simpli…ed by using the cash-in-advance constraint (2.3) and imposing the condition that lim t!1 e rt m t = 0:
This expression makes clear that, as is typical of cash-in-advance models, the e¤ective price of consumption is given by 1 + r + " t . The …rst-order condition for the household's problem is 6) where is the Lagrange multiplier associated with (2.5).
Government
The government collects seignorage revenues and carries out expenditures, g t . To simplify, we assume that government spending yields no utility to the representative household. The government's ‡ow budget constraint is given by
where f t denotes the government's net foreign assets. This ‡ow budget constraint, together with the condition lim t!1 e rt f t = 0; implies the following intertemporal budget constraint for the government:
where, by de…nition, 0 is the present value of government spending:
If the peg is abandoned at time zero the jump in the money supply
is controlled by the central bank through its choice of M 0 . In contrast, if the peg is abandoned at T > 0, the jump in the money supply (M T M T ) is endogenously determined. Under perfect foresight, the path for the exchange rate must be continuous for all t > 0 to rule out arbitrage opportunities. This requirement implies that, in equilibrium, the household reduces its money holdings at time T in anticipation of the higher in ‡ation rate for t T .
Equilibrium Consumption
Combining the household's and government's intertemporal constraints (equations (2.4) and (2.8), respectively), we obtain the economy's aggregate resource constraint:
This constraint implies that the present value of output plus the total net foreign assets in the economy must equal the present value of consumption and government expenditures.
A Sustainable Fixed Exchange Rate Regime
Before time zero, the economy is in a sustainable …xed exchange rate regime, so agents expect " to be permanently zero. Sustainability of the peg requires that the government's net foreign assets be su¢ cient to …nance the present value of government expenditures; that is: f 0 = 0 . Further, in the …xed exchange rate regime, equations (2.3) and (2.9) imply that consumption and real balances are given by:
Using the household's intertemporal constraint we can write consumption before time zero as:
where
Optimal Monetary Policy
Suppose that at time 0 there is an unanticipated increase in the present value of government expenditures from 0 to 0 that must be …nanced with seignorage. Clearly, the peg has to be abandoned at some point because 0 cannot be intertemporally …nanced with " = 0. What is the optimal exit time? Throughout the paper we focus on the perfect commitment solution to this question.
After the …scal shock takes place, the aggregate constraint for the economy is r . Since > 0, the new level of consumption is lower than before. The economy has the same resources as before the …scal shock, so the rise in government spending has to be accommodated by a fall in private consumption.
Assuming, without loss of generality, that the exchange rate remains …xed at t = 0, the corresponding fall in real money balances occurs through a fall in the nominal money supply at t = 0.
It is easy to check (see Rebelo and Végh (2006) ) that the government can replicate the lump sum taxes outcome by either expanding the money supply at a constant rate from t = 0 on, by printing money at t = 0, or by combining these two strategies. So, there are multiple ways for monetary policy to achieve the optimal outcome but all these policies require that the …xed exchange rate be abandoned at time zero.
In contrast, abandoning the peg at time T > 0 yields a lower level of welfare than the policies just discussed. To show this result we use the following proposition.
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Proposition 2.1. Once the …xed exchange rate regime is abandoned at time T > 0, it is optimal to expand the money supply at a constant rate, " T . The optimal path for money growth, conditional on abandonment at time T , is thus:
We now show that any positive " T generates an intertemporal distortion on consumption. The value of " T has to satisfy the government's intertemporal budget constraint, (2.8), which can be written as:
The term
rT represents the net reserve losses incurred by the government as the household rearranges its money balances while the exchange rate is …xed in response to the changes in the path for in ‡ation.
The …rst-order condition for the household's problem, (2.6), implies that consumption is constant within the subperiods 0 < t < T and t T . Let us denote by c 1 and c 2 the level of consumption in the periods 0 < t < T and t T , respectively. Using equations (2.10), (2.12), and the cash-in-advance constraint, (2.3), we can show that, independently of the form of the momentary utility function and the value of T , the net reserve loss incurred by the government is given by:
Using this result, we can rewrite the government budget constraint (2.14) as:
This equation implies that " T > 0. The …rst-order condition for the household's problem, (2.6), implies that c 2 < c 1 . Since the present value of resources that are available for consumption is independent of T , this non- ‡at path of consumption results in lower welfare compared to the case where the peg is abandoned at time zero. The net reserve loss described in (2.15) is a cost that the government incurs when the abandonment of the …xed exchange rate regime is either delayed or, in the case of immediate abandonment, if real money balances fall through a reduction in nominal money balances. However, since this cost represents a transfer from the government to households, it is not a cost to the economy as a whole. As a result, this cost does not a¤ect the optimal exit time. The next section considers the case in which there are social costs associated with the abandonment of the peg.
Exit Costs
In this section we introduce costs of abandoning the …xed exchange regime into our model. We assume that when the …xed exchange rate is abandoned, the government incurs a …scal cost of which also represents a social loss for the economy as a whole. This exit cost can be given several interpretations. First, it can re ‡ect a fall in output and tax revenues following the abandonment of the peg. Second, since banking crises are typically a by-product of currency crises (Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999) ), these costs can stem from bailing out domestic banks (Burnside, Eichenbaum and Rebelo (2004)). Third, these costs can result from bailing out foreign creditors. A devaluation can make it optimal for domestic …rms to default on foreign loans that had been guaranteed by the government. In these circumstances, a devaluation creates a …scal liability for the government. 10 We proceed by setting up the Ramsey problem, starting with the condition that guarantees that the Ramsey solution is implementable as a competitive equilibrium.
The Implementability Condition
We need to distinguish between two cases: T = 0 and T > 0. If the …xed exchange rate is abandoned at T = 0, the government sets a constant, positive rate of devaluation " 0 from time zero onwards. Given this policy, …rst-order condition (2.6) indicates that consumption is constant over time and, from (2.5), this constant level, denoted by c, is given by
where a 0 b 0 +M 0 =S 0 . We assume, without loss of generality, that the exchange rate remains constant (S 0 = S) when the abandonment occurs at time 0. This assumption implies that a 0 = a 0 . Solving for " 0 , we obtain:
This equation is the implementability condition when T = 0. The optimal path for " t , conditional on the peg being abandoned at T > 0, is given by equation (2.13) in Proposition 2.1. The consumer's …rst-order condition (2.6) implies that the levels of consumption within each subperiod (0 < t < T and t T ) are constant. As before, denote these constant levels of consumption 10 We develop this interpretation in a previous version of this paper, available upon request.
by c 1 and c 2 , respectively. Using this notation, we can rewrite the household's intertemporal constraint (2.5) as:
, the values of c 1 and c 2 are given by
Equation (3.4) has two implications. First, c 1 is determined by the household's problem (recall that a 0 = a 0 ) and so it is not a choice variable for the Ramsey planner. Second, c 1 is equal to c 0 (see (2.11)). Equation (3.5) is the implementability condition for the case of T > 0, which can be re-written as:
Government' s Budget Constraint
We can write the government's budget constraint, (2.8), as:
where m 0 and m T denote the real money balances associated with c and c 2 , respectively. The exit cost, , is included in this constraint since it is a …scal cost that the government incurs at time T . Notice that, as T tends to zero, constraint (3.8) reduces to (3.7) indicating that the government's budget constraint is (right-hand) continuous at T = 0.
Using the cash-in-advance constraint, the implementability conditions (3.2) and (3.6), and taking into account that c 1 = c 0 , we can rewrite the government's budget constraint as
Again, since c 2 converges to c as T tends to zero, constraint (3.10) tends to (3.9), which enables us to just use constraint (3.10) below for all T 0:
The Ramsey Problem
Taking into account that c 1 = c 0 , we can rewrite the household's lifetime utility
The Ramsey planner then chooses fc 2 ; T g to maximize the household's lifetime utility, (2.1), subject to constraint (3.10) and a non-negativity constraint on T .
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Once the optimal value of c 2 has been determined, we can use (3.6) to determine the value of " for any t 0.
The …rst-order condition with respect to c 2 can be written as:
The Kuhn-Tucker condition with respect to T is given by:
11 Note that since the RHS of constraint (3.10) is always non-negative, then c 2 c 0 . In addition -and to ensure that c 2 is always positive -we restrict parameter values such that the condition + e rT < c 1 =r is always satis…ed. 12 To obtain conditions (3.12) and (3.13), we have divided by e rT . This term is di¤erent from zero since T must be …nite. Otherwise, given that > 0, the government's intertemporal constraint (3.10) would be violated.
The optimal exit time is characterized by the following proposition, which includes the case of = 0 discussed in the previous section as a special case.
Proposition 3.1. The optimal exit time, T , is given by:
Proof. See Appendix 7.2.
According to this proposition, delaying is optimal only when the …scal shock is low ( < c 0 =er) and takes on an intermediate value. In all other cases, it is optimal to abandon immediately. To understand the intuition underlying this result, it is useful to rewrite the Kuhn-Tucker condition, (3.13), using (3.12), as:
Since c 2 < c 0 , the term labeled "cost of delaying"is always positive and captures the intertemporal distortion associated with delaying. Of course, even if abandonment were immediate, this term is positive because of the negative wealth e¤ect resulting from higher government spending. But delaying increases this term further because the intertemporal distortion becomes larger as c 2 becomes smaller.
The bene…t of delaying is the ‡ow saving, r , relative to post-crisis consumption, c 2 . This bene…t results from reducing the present discounted value of the cost of abandonment. If the cost of delaying is larger than the bene…t of delaying, then immediate abandonment is optimal. 13 When c 0 =er, the intertemporal distortion introduced by delaying is so large that it dominates the bene…t of delaying for any admissible . To see this, notice that as increases, c 2 converges to zero. As a result, both the bene…t of delaying and the cost of delaying become arbitrary large. However, the cost of delaying prevails because r < c 0 and hence the net bene…t of delaying tends to 1. In other words, the fact that the bene…t of delaying is bounded relative to c 1 explains why the cost of delaying prevails. When < c 0 =er, the intertemporal distortion imposed by abandoning the peg for some T > 0 is smaller and therefore the decision comes down to a trade-o¤ between the costs and bene…ts of delaying. Clearly, if = 0, there are no bene…ts from delaying and immediate abandonment is optimal. For small values of , the bene…ts are still small relative to the intertemporal distortion that needs to be imposed and immediate exit is still optimal. There is some threshold level of , , beyond which the bene…t of delaying becomes large enough to warrant a delayed exit. For values of larger than , that is values of close to the maximum admissible value, once again both the cost of delaying and the bene…t of delaying become arbitrarily large but the cost of delaying dominates. The intuition is analogous to the one just discussed.
Some illustrative calculations
The table in proposition 3.1 shows that delaying the abandonment and incurring some reserve losses is optimal in only one out of six possible cases. However, the proposition says nothing about the empirical relevance of each of the six cases. We now provide some back-of-the-envelope calculations to illustrate the predictions of our model for T using empirically-plausible values of the cost of abandoning ( ) and the …scal shock ( ). While admittedly crude, these calculations shed light on how often it is optimal to abandon immediately. The choice of values 13 It is important to keep in mind that admissible values of are bounded from above since c 2 must be positive (see Appendix 7.2 for details).
for and is far from trivial and forces us to make some stark connections between the model and reality. For the …scal shock we focus our attention on the 37 episodes underlying Table 1 we consider values of ranging from one to eight percent. Table 2 reports the percentage of cases (among the 37 episodes of Table 1) Table 2 .
We thus conclude that the model predicts immediate abandonment for a broad range of values of , which is consistent with the evidence shown above indicating that many countries have abandoned exchange rate pegs with still plenty of international reserves in their co¤ers. Figure 2 shows the behavior of the optimal values of T , ", and the reserve loss as a function of for a small …scal shock ( < c 0 =er). Panel A shows the behavior of the optimal exit time. Up to = , it is optimal to abandon immediately. In the region in which T > 0, the value of T is a non-monotonic function of . For values of larger than , it again becomes optimal to abandon immediately.
Panel B of Figure 2 shows that the optimal in ‡ation rate (") is always an increasing function of (i.e., for T = 0 and T > 0). Finally, Panel C in Figure 2 illustrates the behavior of the loss of reserves, which equals c 0 c 2 , at the time of abandonment. Since c 0 is independent of T and , the reserve loss when T > 0 depends only on the behavior of c 2 . The 14 These calculations assume that the elasticity of intertemporal substitution is 0.30, which is consistent with the estimated reported in Reinhart and Végh (1995) . 15 Of course, even when T > 0 there are many cases in which the reserve losses are small. Hence, the cases of immediate abandonment constitute a lower bound for instances of abandonment with small or no reserve losses.
reserve loss is an increasing function of . When T = 0 there are of course no reserve losses. Figure 3 illustrates the behavior of T , ", and the loss of reserves as a function of the …scal shock for a given value of . 16 Panel A shows that, when T > 0, the optimal exit time is a decreasing function of the …scal shock. In other words, the larger the …scal shock the sooner it is optimal to abandon the peg. Intuitively, a larger …scal shock requires a higher in ‡ation rate once the peg is abandoned, which imposes a larger intertemporal distortion. As a result, it is optimal to abandon earlier to reduce the intertemporal distortion. When the value of the …scal shock reaches ( c 0 =er), it becomes optimal to abandon immediately. The rate of in ‡ation after the regime is abandoned does not depend on whenever T > 0. This property re ‡ects two opposing forces that cancel each other out. First, for a given T , a larger …scal shock tends to increase the in ‡ation rate. Second, since T falls as the …scal shock increases, the in ‡ation rate falls. In this case of logarithmic preferences, these two e¤ects exactly cancel each other out.
When it is optimal to abandon immediately (i.e., for ), the in ‡ation rate is an increasing function of the …scal shock. When = 0, it is not optimal to abandon the peg and hence the optimal in ‡ation rate is zero.
We conclude by discussing the e¤ects of introducing a borrowing constraint on the government. To simplify we consider the case in which government expenditure is constant at a level g 0 before the …scal shock and at a level g 0 > g 0 after the …scal shock. Suppose that there is a binding borrowing constraint that dictates that f t f . It can be shown that lifetime utility, V , is an increasing function of T for values of T below the optimal. Once the regime is abandoned, f t becomes constant, f t = f T for t T . The value of f T is a decreasing function of T . Thus, whenever T > 0, a borrowing constraint forces the economy to abandon the …xed exchange rate regime before T . In this situation we can think of central bankers as following the KFG abandonment rule, since they maintain the regime for as long as possible and, at the time of abandonment, exhaust their ability to borrow. In general, however, appealing to the presence of a borrowing constraint does not justify the KFG exit rule since, when T = 0, borrowing constraints have no impact on the decision to exit the …xed exchange rate.
Model Extensions
In order to assess the theoretical robustness of our key results, we explore in this section several extensions of the basic model analyzed in Section 3.
Time-Varying Exit Costs
Consider the case in which the exit cost, , varies over time. On the one hand, the exit cost can decline over time if postponing the abandonment of the peg gives …rms time to prepare for the change in regime by changing prices or hedging exchange rate risk. On the other hand, the costs associated with a currency crisis can increase with the post-crisis rate of in ‡ation. To simplify we assume that t grows at a constant rate that can be positive or negative:
Here t is the cost of abandoning the peg at time t, is a positive constant, and is the rate at which the cost changes over time. The consumer's problem remains the same as in Section 3. The government's budget constraint now reads as:
The …rst-order condition for the Ramsey problem, (3.12), remains valid and the Kuhn-Tucker condition is given by:
3)
The following proposition generalizes the results in Proposition 3.1. When = r, the present discounted value of the exit cost is independent of T , so there is no bene…t from delaying. If > r, delaying increases the present discounted value of the exit cost. In both of these cases, it is optimal to abandon right away. When < r, delaying reduces the present discounted value of the exit costs, so delaying can be optimal.
To illustrate the e¤ect of di¤erent values of , Figure 4 plots T as a function of the …scal shock ( ) for three values of ( = 0, = 0:03, and = 0:03). 17 The = 0 case is the case studied in Section 3. When is negative ( = 0:03), the threshold value of beyond which it is optimal to abandon right away is larger than that for the = 0 case. The opposite is true when is positive ( = 0:03).
The intuition for these results can be explained using equation which, in light of (4.1), can also be written as (r ) t . Compare the = 0 case with the < 0 case. When < 0 the ‡ow saving from delaying for an additional moment for a given t is higher for the = 0 case. This e¤ect calls for an additional delay. However, a negative implies that, all else equal, the current cost of devaluing, e T , is smaller than it would be in the = 0 case. By making the ‡ow saving smaller, this e¤ect calls for a smaller delay. For small values of T (and in particular around T = 0), the …rst e¤ect dominates, which implies that the threshold value beyond which it is optimal to abandon immediately is a decreasing function of , as illustrated in Figure 4 (notice that the threshold is the largest for = 0:03 and the smallest for = 0:03). When comparing = 0:03 and = 0, this …rst e¤ect continues to dominate up to the value of corresponding to point A in Figure 4 . Below this point the second e¤ect dominates and, for a given …scal shock, T is smaller for = 0:03 than for = 0. 
The Exit Cost is Not a Fiscal Cost
So far we have assumed that the exit cost is both a …scal cost and a social cost.
One could think that the …scal nature of the exit cost drives our main results since delaying the abandonment reduces the exit cost that has to be …nanced by the …scal authority. To show that our results do not depend on the exit cost being a …scal cost, we brie ‡y discuss a version of the model presented in Section 3 in which the cost of abandonment, , is a reduction in the economy's endowment and does not enter the government's budget constraint. This cost can be interpreted as a loss in output that occurs when the peg is abandoned.
Formally, the only modi…cation to the model of Section 3 is in the household's intertemporal constraint which is now given by
Here y=r e rT is the present discounted value of the endowment net of the cost of abandoning the peg. Households take T as given, so they view e rT as exogenous to their decisions. However, the Ramsey planner takes the exit cost into account.
The main complication introduced by this formulation is that the Ramsey planner's problem is not continuous in T at time zero. The reason is that c 1 depends on T since the term e rT a¤ects the household's budget constraint.
Therefore, c 1 is a choice variable for the Ramsey planner when T > 0 but not when T = 0. We thus opted to solve the model numerically by …rst computing T analytically assuming that the solution is interior and then comparing the value of V associated with this solution with the value of V for T = 0. We veri…ed that our main results hold for a wide range of parameters. Figure 5 shows that T falls with the …scal shock until a certain threshold, beyond which it is optimal to abandon immediately. In Rebelo and Végh (2006), we also illustrate T as a function of the cost of abandonment, , and show how, as in the model of Section 3, it is optimal to abandon immediately for small values of . Beyond a certain threshold of , the optimal time of abandonment is an increasing function of .
Intuitively, even though is not a …scal cost, it still has …scal repercussions. An increase in reduces c 2 , which is the tax base for the post-crisis in ‡ation tax.
Increasing T raises households'wealth, and hence c 2 , which increases tax revenues for a given post-crisis in ‡ation rate. This e¤ect needs to be traded-o¤ against the fact that delaying implies a higher post-crisis devaluation rate and hence a larger intertemporal distortion.
Non-Unitary Elasticity of Intertemporal Substitution
Up to this point, we have assumed that momentary utility is logarithmic. Consider the more general case in which utility is given by: The results that we obtained for a very wide range of parameters are qualitatively the same as those discussed in Section 3 for the logarithmic case. 19 In particular, it is still the case that T is a decreasing function of the …scal shock until certain threshold value beyond which T = 0. For interior solutions, a lower (higher) elasticity of substitution increases (decreases) T > 0 because it implies a smaller (larger) intertemporal distortion for any given in ‡ation rate. Similarly, there is a certain threshold value of below which T = 0. Above this threshold,
T is an increasing function of . Further, for a given value of , the smaller (larger) is the intertemporal elasticity of substitution, the higher (lower) is T because the lower (larger) is the impact on utility of a given rate of post-crisis in ‡ation. Hence, it is optimal to delay more.
The Exit Cost Increases with the Fiscal Shock
So far we have assumed that the exit cost is independent of the …scal shock.
However, one can imagine scenarios in which the exit cost depends positively on the …scal shock. We now analyze this case and show that our main results continue to hold.
Suppose that the cost of abandoning the peg is given by: This equation is analogous to equation (3.14) . We now show that, as in the case discussed in Section 3, there is a threshold value of the …scal shock beyond which it is optimal to abandon immediately. For a su¢ ciently large …scal shock, both the cost and bene…t of delaying become arbitrary large, but the former dominates and hence it is optimal to abandon right away. The intuition parallels the discussion following equation (3.14) in Section 3. In other words, the key is that the ‡ow saving is bounded relative to c 1 and, hence, for large …scal shocks, the cost of delaying dominates and immediate abandonment is optimal.
Finally, we also show (see Appendix 7.7 of Rebelo and Végh (2006) ) that when the solution is interior the optimal T is a decreasing function of the …scal shock.
Stochastic Fiscal Reform
In sections 3 and 4 we study the optimal monetary policy in models where there are both …scal and social costs of abandoning the …xed exchange rate regime. We now consider an economy where these costs are absent but where government spending is stochastic. As in the previous sections, we assume that before time zero the …xed exchange rate regime was sustainable, so the government's net foreign assets were su¢ cient to …nance the present value of government spending. At time zero the economy learns that the present value of government spending has increased by . The new element introduced in this section is that while the exchange rate is …xed (after time zero but before the peg is abandoned) there can be a reduction in government spending that makes the peg, once again, sustainable. This expenditure reduction occurs according to a Poisson process with arrival rate . If the peg is abandoned, the increase in government spending becomes permanent and has to be …nanced with seignorage revenues. There is thus an option value of holding on to the peg. This formulation captures in a simple way the idea that a …xed exchange rate regime exerts pressure on the …scal authorities to enact reforms to make the peg sustainable. This pressure disappears once the exchange rate ‡oats. An alternative interpretation is that the country can receive a bailout transfer from abroad that pays for the increase in government spending and renders the peg sustainable. This external bailout arrives according to a
Poisson process.
The size of the …scal reform or of the external bailout that has to occur to make the …xed exchange rate regime sustainable depends, naturally, on the path of government spending. If the reform occurs at time t, the present value of government spending from time t on has to be reduced to a value t given by: and time t, all that is necessary to make the peg sustainable is to cancel the plans for new government spending in the future. However, if new spending has already taken place in the time interval up to time t the government needs to reduce the present value of government spending below its level before the …scal shock.
The optimal policy consists in choosing the time T at which the …xed exchange rate regime is abandoned, if a …scal reform has not materialized in the meantime. A higher value of T makes a …scal reform more likely. However, the longer the horizon T , the larger the intertemporal consumption distortion that the government has to introduce if the reform does not occur.
The Time When Reform Occurs
We start by characterizing the case in which a …scal reform has just occurred making the …xed exchange rate sustainable. Consumption is constant and its level, which we denote by c , can be computed using the household's budget constraint:
Here b and m denote the levels of net foreign assets and real balances that households had in the period where the reform took place. The term (c m) represents the jump in real balances that occurs when agents learn that the …xed exchange rate regime has become sustainable. Lifetime utility is given by:
The t T Regime Suppose that we have reached time T and a reform has not occurred. The …xed exchange rate regime is abandoned and the growth rate of money rises to a level " such that the government's intertemporal budget constraint is satis…ed. Consumption is constant at a level which we denote by c 2 .
This level can be computed using the household's budget constraint:
where (c 2 m) represents the jump in real balances that takes place at time T in response to a permanent increase in in ‡ation from zero to ". Using (5.2) to solve for c 2 , we can compute lifetime utility at time T :
The value function (5.3) bears a simple relation with the value function associated with the reform regime:
where p is given by
The fact that r = and that in ‡ation is constant means that for any time period t T the value function coincides with V (b + m; T ):
The Regime for t T and No Reform The optimality equation for the household's problem during this period is:
The …rst order condition with respect to consumption (c 1 ) is:
It is easy to verify that the value function has the form:
This equation has a simple interpretation. Consider …rst an economy in which a …scal reform has no chance of occurring ( = 0) and which will switch to the ‡oating regime with certainty at time T . Since utility declines by log(p)=r at time T , lifetime utility at time t would be:
Our value function is similar to (5.6) but the discount factor applied to log(p)=r incorporates to re ‡ect the fact that there is an ongoing probability of a …scal reform until time T .
Optimal Monetary Policy
At time zero, when the economy learns that there has been an increase in the present value of government spending, the lifetime utility of the household declines from V (b + m) to V (b + m; 0) (given by equation (5.5)).
The central bank chooses T , the maximum length of time that it is optimal to wait for a …scal reform to occur. If the economy reaches time T > 0 without a …scal reform, the central bank has to print money to satisfy the government's intertemporal budget constraint. Since it is optimal to choose a constant growth rate of money, the government's present value resource constraint is: This equation holds with equality whenever T > 0. Equation (5.9) is similar to the one that characterizes the case in which the exit cost is increasing with the …scal shock (see equation (4.7)). The term e rT re ‡ects the fact that, as time passes, the size of the …scal reform has to increase in order to restore the sustainability of the …xed exchange rate.
The optimal abandonment time is characterized by the following proposition.
Proposition 5.1. For every …nite positive value of , there is a threshold value for the present value of government spending, , such that for 0 > it is optimal to abandon the peg at time zero (T = 0), while for 0 it is optimal to delay abandoning the peg (T 0). The value of is increasing in .
Proof: See Appendix 7.5.
The intuition for this proposition is similar to that of the case in which the exit cost is increasing with the …scal shock. Take as given and evaluate (5.9)
for T = 0: optimal for large values of . The fact that is increasing in is also intuitive: it means that when the reform arrival rate is higher, the range of …scal shocks for which it is optimal to delay abandoning the peg is larger.
Conclusion
Versions of the Krugman-Flood-Garber currency crisis model are widely used to study the abandonment of …xed exchange rate regimes. This class of models assumes that the central bank follows a mechanical exit rule: a peg is abandoned if and only if international reserves reach a critical lower bound. From a positive standpoint the KFG rule is at odds with many episodes in which the central bank 20 It should be clear that in this case T = 0 is the global optimum. In order for c 2 to be positive, it must be the case that e rT < c 0 =r, so for any T > 0 the left-hand side of (5.9) converges to 1.
has plenty of international reserves at the time of abandonment. From a normative standpoint, our analysis suggests that the KFG rule is suboptimal.
We characterize the optimal exit strategy in a model in which the …xed exchange rate regime has become unsustainable due to an unexpected increase in the present value of government spending. We show that when there are no exit costs, it is optimal to abandon immediately. When there are exit costs, the optimal abandonment date is a decreasing function of the size of the …scal shock. In particular, immediate abandonment is optimal for large …scal shocks.
In this paper, we have studied a basic monetary model where the only impact of in ‡ation is to distort intertemporal consumption allocations. This analysis provides us with a point of departure to study richer environments in which tax revenue and the cost of …nancing public debt are endogenous and where monetary policy may a¤ect the level of economic activity.
7. Appendices
Episode selection
Our original sample consists of the 96 currency crisis episodes identi…ed in Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999) and updates. Since the selection criteria used by Kaminsky and Reinhart is based on a weighted average of reserve losses and changes in the exchange rate, we chose a sub-sample based exclusively on changes in the exchange rate. Speci…cally, we chose those episodes in which the devaluation in the month of abandonment is at least 10 percent and that meet one of the following criteria: (a) there was a …xed exchange rate (or a negative rate of change in the exchange rate) for at least 12 months before the devaluation; and (b) devaluation in the 12 months following and including the month of abandonment is at least twice as large as the devaluation in the previous 12 months.
Proof of Proposition 3.1
We …rst outline some preliminary steps that consist in expressing the Kuhn-Tucker condition solely as a function of the parameters. We then let > 0 and T = 0 and show the following: 1) If = 0, it is optimal to abandon right away; 2) if c 0 =er, it is optimal to abandon right away regardless of the value of ; and 3) if < c 0 =er; whether the solution is interior or not depends on the value of :
Preliminaries
Our starting point is the Kuhn-Tucker condition (3.14) which, using the government budget constraint, (3.10), can be expressed as:
c 0 c 0 r(e rT + ) 1 r c 0 r(e rT + ) 0.
To simplify notation, let:
Then de…ne:
This expression implies:
We need to impose bounds on and to ensure that c 2 is positive. Equation (3.10) implies:
For a given , is bounded by:
For a given , is bounded by: < e rT (c 0 =r ).
= 0 case
We now show that if = 0, it is always optimal to abandon at time 0 for any strictly positive …scal shock. Evaluate (7.1) at = T = 0 to obtain (0; 0; > 0) = log (p) (p 1) < 0.
Case c 0 =er
We now show that if c 0 =er, then it is optimal to abandon at time 0 regardless of the value of . To this end, we need to consider two sub-cases.
Case a:
> c 0 =2r. Evaluate expression (7.2) at T = 0 to obtain (0; ; ) = (p =c 0 ) (c 0 r 2r ) < 0 since > c 0 =2r. Hence, > c 0 =2r is a suf…cient condition for < 0. Recall that (0; 0; > 0) < 0. The Kuhn-Tucker condition is thus always negative and the solution is always a corner solution at We now show that if < c 0 =er, the Kuhn-Tucker condition as a function of has two roots, which we denote by . and , with < .
Notice that if < c 0 =er, then: p(0; max ; ) c 0 =r > e. This inequality implies that: (0; max ; < c 0 =er) > 0. Since we know that (0; 0; < c 0 =er) < 0, by continuity it follows that exists. To establish existence of the second root, , we now show that the limit of (T; ; ) as approaches the upper bound given in (7.4) is 1. This limit is given by:
Since p ! 1 as ! c 0 =r , we need to collect terms in p to evaluate the resulting coe¢ cient:
The coe¢ cient on p is always negative because, from (7.4), < c 0 =r. Hence, the limit is 1. It follows that for < < , the solution is interior (T > 0), whereas for 0 and (with an upper bound given by < c 0 =r ), the solution is T = 0.
So far we have established that for some ranges of parameter values, we have "local"corner solutions (i.e., around T = 0). To show that these corner solutions 21 It is easy to check that the second-order condition is satis…ed.
are also global (i.e., that they hold for any T ), it is enough to show that for any given and , (T; ; ) is strictly decreasing in T for any T 0. This is indeed true as this derivative can be shown to be given by p T r e rT =c 0 < 0 (since, as can be easily veri…ed, p T > 0).
Behavior of T , ", and Reserve Loss as a Function of .
Behavior of T: Take as given 2 (0; c 0 =er) and consider the ranges for (established above) for which the solution for T is interior. In that case, (T ; ; ) = 0 implicitly de…nes T as a function of (notice that T < 0).
where the behavior of has been derived above. Hence, T is an increasing Behavior of ": For the range of interior solutions -and taking into account that p = (1 + r + ") =(1 + r) -it follows from (7.1) that:
When T = 0, " is also an increasing function of , as can be easily checked. Figure   2 , Panel B, illustrates the optimal " as a function of . Clearly, at = = , this function need not be di¤erentiable.
Behavior of loss of reserves. By de…nition, the reserve loss at T is equal to c 0 c 2 . Since c 0 is independent of both T and , we just need to check the behavior of c 2 as a function of for interior solutions (naturally, for T = 0, the reserve loss is zero). Since c 2 = c 0 =p, it follows that:
Hence, the reserve loss is an increasing function of when the solution is interior (see Figure 2 , Panel C).
Behavior of T , ", and the Loss of Reserves as a Function of
Behavior of T We now derive the behavior of the optimal values of T , ", and the loss of reserves as a function of for a given 2 ( ; ). As shown above, the solution is interior for c 0 =er. In this range, setting (7.1) to zero yields:
Further, recalling the expression for c 2 from (7.3) and taking into account that, at an interior optimum, p and hence c 2 do not depend on T , it follows that
For any c 0 =er, the solution is T = 0, as shown above. In Figure 3 , and without loss of generality, the given value of has been taken to be = (c 0 =r) (1 2=e). It can be checked that [(c 0 =r) (1 2=e); c 0 =er] = 0 and hence in Panel A, T ( = c 0 =er) = 0:
Behavior of " From (7.1), it follows that when the solution is interior, p and hence " are fully determined by and are therefore independent of . Hence, for 0 < < c 0 =er, the optimal " does not depend on . 22 For c 0 =er, T is zero. In that case -as can be easily checked -" is an increasing function of . (See Panel B in Figure 3 .) 22 For = 0, the optimal " is zero since T = 1, i.e. the peg is never abandoned.
Behavior of the loss of reserves Finally, consider the reserve loss ( c 0 c 2 ). Clearly, for c 0 =er, the reserve loss is zero since the peg is abandoned right away. For 0 < < c 0 =er, the reserve loss equals c 0 (p 1)=p > 0. Since p is independent of when the solution is interior, then the reserve loss is also independent of in this range.
Proof of Proposition 5.1
It is useful to de…ne the function K(p) as K(p) (1 p)r+(r+ ) log(p). Equation (5.9) can be re-written as: K(p) 0: This function is concave and, for > 0, it intersects the x-axis twice, at p = 1 and at a value of p greater than 1 which we denote by p . The maximum value of K(p) is achieved for p = (r + )=r. To check whether T = 0 is optimal we can set T = 0 in (5.8) to compute the value of p that would be consistent with the government budget constraint if the peg was abandoned immediately. We denote this value of p by p 0 : We can then use this expression for p 0 to evaluate the Kuhn-Tucker condition. If K(p 0 ) < 0, T = 0 is optimal, otherwise T > 0 is optimal. The variable p 0 is an increasing function of which takes the value 1 when = 0 (in this case there is no expenditure shock at time zero and the regime continues to be sustainable).
The value of p 0 converges to in…nity as ! b 0 + y=r. This limiting value of is such that government spending exhausts all the resources of the economy. De…ne as the value of such that p 0 = p . Then for > , K(p 0 ) < 0 so it is optimal to abandon immediately. For < , K(p 0 ) > 0 and T > 0.
Finally, it is easy to see that p is an increasing function of . This property implies that is also an increasing function of . 
